We consider a continuum of workers ranked according to their abilities to acquire education and two¯rms with di®erent technologies that imperfectly compete in wages to attract these workers. Once employed, each worker bears an education cost proportional to his/her initial ability, this cost being higher in the high-technology¯rm. At the Nash equilibrium, we show that the unemployed workers are those with the lowest initial abilities. We then study di®erent policies that subsidy either the education cost or wages and compare them. We found that the¯rst best allocation can only be implemented by selective policies. We then analyze second best non-selective policies that do not discriminate between workers and¯rms and show that, in terms of welfare, subsidizing education costs or wages is strictly equivalent.
Introduction
In the last two decades, it has been observed that low-skilled workers earn relative lower wages and face relative higher rates of unemployment compared to higher-skilled workers. For example, in the U.S., between 1963 and 1989, wages for the least skilled have fallen by about 5% whereas for the most skilled they have increased by about 40% (Katz, Loveman and Blanch°ower, 1992, Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993) . In European countries, where relative wage°e xibility is lower, this inequality between skilled and unskilled workers has been re°ected through di®erent access to employment. Even though there has not been a decrease in relative wages, the unemployment rate of the less-skilled workers has sharply increased (OECD, 1996) .
In this paper, we propose a simple theoretical framework that captures some of these ideas by focussing on the interaction between¯rms using di®erent technologies and workers' heterogeneity. In our model, there are in fact two technologies (or two¯rms) in the economy: an old one and a new one. Workers are all heterogeneous in their ability of acquiring education. We assume that, in order to get a job, a worker must be perfectly matched with thē rm and thus must incur an education cost proportional to his/her initial ability. Since the new technology requires a higher level of skill than the old one, the same worker bears a higher education cost to work in the high-tech¯rm. In this framework, the most able individuals tend to work in the high-tech rm and the less-skilled ones in the other¯rm. Moreover, because workers unevenly trade o® between the two¯rms, each¯rm faces a¯nitely elastic labor supply and thus enjoys some monopsonistic power over its workforce. At the labor market equilibrium, inequalities in terms of net wages and access to employment arise because of labor heterogeneity and imperfect competition. Indeed, we show, at the Nash equilibrium, that the unemployed workers are those with the lowest initial abilities. On one hand, unemployment can be considered as voluntary since gross wages o®er insu±cient remuneration after education costs are substracted. On the other, unemployment can also be considered as involuntary due to the non-cooperative wage setting process. In the absence of strategic interactions generated by this process, full employment may prevail.
We then study di®erent policies that either subsidy the education cost or wages (see in particular Layard, 1994 Layard, , 1995 . We model our problem in two stages. In the¯rst stage, the government proposes one of its policies anticipating the market outcome of the second stage in which¯rms set wages noncooperatively. We found that the¯rst best allocation can only be implemented by selective policies. We then analyze second best non-selective policies that do not discriminate between workers and¯rms (because for example of legal constraints) and show that subsidizing education costs or wages is equivalent in terms of welfare.
Our model is related to other studies that introduce labor heterogeneity and imperfect competition in the labor market. In Stevens (1994) ,¯rms have an incentive to di®erentiate their skill requirements in order to obtain monopsony power in the labor market. Hamilton, Thisse and Zenou (2000) and Wauthy and Zenou (2000) assume that¯rms and workers are heterogeneous, which implies that¯rms have oligopsonistic power in the labor market and thus charge a lower wage than the competitive one. Chang and Wang (1996) consider a setting in which a¯rm derives market power over its incumbent workers from the fact that rival¯rms do not know how much speci¯c training these workers have acquired. Finally, Sattinger (1993) develops di®erent models in which a large number of workers and a small number of jobs (or¯rms) have to be assigned to each other, even though¯rms have no market power. Our paper is quite di®erent since the focus is on inequality, unemployment and policies whereas in the above models in which full employment prevails the focus is mainly on the¯nancing of the education cost and on job matching. 1 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We state the basic model in section 2 and compute the Nash equilibrium in section 3. We then analyze the¯rst-best allocation and the two selective policies in section 4. Section 5 is devoted to the second-best (non-selective) policies. Finally, section 6 concludes.
The model
The economy consists of two sectors: a high-technology and a low-technology one. In each sector, there is one representative¯rm. This set-up is admittedly highly stylized since each¯rm is in fact a monopsonist within its sector. Formally, it requires that either only one¯rm exists in each sector or several¯rms collude to act as one monopsonist. 2 This last possibility is not so unreasonable since workers decide where to work by comparing net wages across sectors and, in each sector,¯rms require the same level of quali¯cation. This implies that workers may enjoy very limited mobility within the sector so that some market 1 More recently, some papers have studied unemployment in the context of heterogenous workers and¯rms but with horizontal di®erentiation. See in particular Bhaskar and To, 1999 , Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999 , Fiorillo et al., 2000 and Jellal, Thisse and Zenou (2001) . Our present paper is quite di®erent from these approaches in particular because (i) workers and¯rms are vertically di®erentiated, (ii) we study education and wage second-best policies. 2 Observe that our framework could easily introduce many identical¯rms in each sector. It su±ces to consider a Cournot game instead of a Bertrand one. All our main results would remain the same. power prevails in each sector, even if¯rms are numerous. 3 In order to focus on the interaction between these two sectors and the pool of heterogeneous workers, we have chosen the following assumptions. Each rm, 1 and 2, is characterized by a scalar E i (i = 1; 2), that indicates the skill level required by each of them, and a real constant marginal productivity, H, and L respectively, with E 1 > E 2 > 0 and H > L > 0. Hence¯rm 1 can be thought of as the`skilled' or high-technology¯rm and¯rm 2 as the`unskilled' or low-technology¯rm.
In the labor market,¯rms imperfectly compete in wages to attract workers, whereas in the product market they are price takers. Each¯rm maximizes its pro¯t by setting their wages non-cooperatively. The pro¯t functions are respectively given by:
where S i (w 1 ; w 2 ) is the labor supply addressed to¯rm i.
There is a continuum of workers ranked by their increasing ability of learning education and distributed uniformly in the interval [0; t + ]. For simplicity, we assume that the density of workers in each point of the interval is taken to be unity so that the total number of workers in the economy is equal to t + . Each individual is characterized by a parameter t 2 [0; t + ]. This parameter is de¯ned in a way that the education cost is increasing in t. In order to work in rm i, a worker of type t must bear an education cost equal to tE i (i = 1; 2). In other words, even though there a continuum of ex ante heterogenous workers, ex post these workers can only achieve two levels of education: high-school graduate (with marginal productivity L) or university graduate (with marginal productivity H).
We assume that workers bear the totality of the education cost. This assumption is quite natural since education is basically general human capital and thus¯rms are not likely to¯nance it because it would be too easily transferred from one¯rm to another within a sector. We also assume that each worker is endowed with an indivisible unit of labor and receives the same unemployment bene¯t, whatever his/her unemployment duration. For simplicity, we assume that this bene¯t is normalized to zero.
Thus, in order to decide whether to work or not, a worker trades o® w i and tE i , where tE i is the reservation wage for a worker of type t, i.e. the wage 3 A way to justify this intuition is the possibility of di®erent industries where there is speci¯c human capital. If on top of that,¯rms also locate in di®erent cities, the number of potential employers for any given worker may become really low. Firms may then act as local monopsonies. The only limit to their market power is the possibility for workers to change industry or city, which is costly. Thus, monopsony power is bounded by mobility costs in a broad sense. Our analysis of monopsonistic¯rms could be considered as valid when these mobility costs are su±ciently large. level that makes him/her indi®erent between accepting to work in¯rm i and be unemployed. According to our previous assumptions, the reservation wage is positively related to workers' ability. When w i¸t E i (i = 1; 2), the worker decides whether to work in¯rm 1 or 2. The trade o® is now between the wage di®erential w 1 ¡w 2 and the education cost di®erential t(E 1 ¡E 2 ). For instance, if w 1 ¡ w 2 > t(E 1 ¡ E 2 ), the worker of type t decides to work in¯rm 1 (the skilled one). The education cost schedule, or equivalently the reservation wage distribution, de¯ned as a function of the type of workers, is depicted in Figure  1 .
The following comments can be drawn from this¯gure. First, working in¯rm 1 requires a higher education cost than in¯rm 2, for all workers, i.e. tE 1 > tE 2 for all t 2 [0; t + ]. This captures the idea of a skilled and an unskilled rm. Second, the education cost di®erential increases with t, indicating that the lower the ability, the larger the education cost di®erential, and thus the more di±cult is the access to¯rm 1. In order to make the worker of typẽ t indi®erent between the two¯rms, there must be a wage di®erential of ¢. Obviously, for this wage di®erential, workers of type t <t (resp. t >t) work in¯rm 1 (resp.¯rm 2).
3 Labor market equilibrium and the structure of unemployment
Labor supplies
The worker i's net wage, w n i , directly depends on his/her ability. It is given by:
w n i = w i ¡ tE i A worker is thus willing to accept a job if it yields the highest positive net wage; he/she prefers to stay unemployed if the net wage is negative. In the present model, staying unemployed essentially means that given prevailing wages, learning a technology is too costly for the lowest-skilled workers. In Figure 2 , we have depicted the distribution of net wages for initial wage levels of w 1 and w 2 . Observe that¯rm 1's net wage function is steeper than¯rm 2's. This re°ects the di®erence in skill levels and thus in education cost. Observe also that workers of type t¸t 2 are enjoying negative net wages in¯rms 1 and 2 and therefore will stay unemployed. On the other hand, since workers of type t 2 [t 1 ; t 2 ] obtain a positive net wage in¯rm 2 and a negative one in¯rm 1, they decide to work in¯rm 2. This is also true for workers of type t 2 [t; t 1 ] who enjoy the highest net wage in¯rm 2. Moreover, workers of type t <t choose to work in¯rm 1 for the same reason.
We may therefore summarize the allocation of workers for wage levels w 1 and w 2 as follows:
8 < :
where U(w 1 ; w 2 ) de¯nes the level of the unemployment given the wage policy. Furthermore, the marginal worker of typet (indi®erent between working in rm 1 or 2), is de¯ned such that w 2 ¡tE 2 = w 1 ¡tE 1 , i.e.
whereas the worker of type t i (indi®erent between working in¯rm i and staying unemployed) is equal to:
The wage competition process is then easily understood by using Figure  2 . Assuming thatw 1 is given, a rise in the wage o®ered by¯rm 2 yields an upward parallel shift of w n 2 (t) and marginal workers of types e t and t 2 move respectively to the left and to the right. Therefore, the labor supply addressed to¯rm 2 increases. This is due to two reasons:¯rst, some workers now prefer rm 2 to¯rm 1, and second, some individuals now¯nd it more pro¯table to work in¯rm 2 instead of staying unemployed. This is not the case when one considers an increase of w 1 while keeping w 2 unchanged. Indeed, in this case, rm 1's labor supply increases because, and that is the only reason, workers who wanted previously to work in¯rm 2 now decide to work in¯rm 1 (the marginal worker of type e t now moves to the right whereas the one of type t 2 is not a®ected and thus does not change his/her position). 4 Observe¯nally that full employment requires that the worker of type t + enjoys a positive net wage in at least one¯rm, typically¯rm 2.
By generalizing the argument above and by using equations (3) and (4) we can characterize labor supplies in the following way.
Equilibrium wages
In equilibrium, two market con¯gurations may be obtained: either wages are such that all workers are willing to work, either some of them are left unemployed because they are o®ered negative net wages in both¯rms. In the latter case, only low ability workers stay unemployed. Since we are interested in unemployment policies, we will focus only on this con¯guration. In order to show the unique Nash equilibrium in wages, when unemployment prevails and the two¯rms are active, we proceed in three steps. First (i), we characterize our equilibrium by identifying the necessary restrictions on parameters. Second (ii), given these restrictions, we derive the unique equilibrium wage candidate. Finally (iii), we show that the restrictions on parameters identi¯ed in (i) are satis¯ed at the Nash equilibrium.
Starting with (i), we must consider the second part of S 1 (w 1 ; w 2 ) and S 2 (w 1 ; w 2 ) de¯ned by equations (5b) and (6b) since they ensure that both some workers do not take a job and the two¯rms are active. By assuming that t 1 < t 2 , which is equivalent to w 1 =E 1 < w 2 =E 2 , we rule out cases (5c)-(6a) and (5a)-(6d) in which only one¯rm is active (preemption). By also assuming that w 2 < t + E 2 , we are guaranteed that there will be unemployment in equilibrium.
Our second step (ii) is to calculate the equilibrium Nash candidate. For that, we¯rst compute the reaction functions by maximizing (1) and (2) with respect to wages. We obtain:
By combining these two reaction functions, we easily obtain the following equilibrium candidate for a market con¯guration with unemployment and no preemption:
Our last step (iii) is to verify that our two conditions w 1 =E 1 < w 2 =E 2 (no preemption) and w 2 < t + E 2 (unemployment) are satis¯ed at the equilibrium candidate. Let us¯rst check that w N 2 < t + E 2 , i.e. the worker with the highest reservation wage prefers to stay unemployed instead of working in¯rm 2. This is equivalent to:
When condition (9a) holds, some workers remain unemployed in equilibrium: they are precisely those who are characterized by the lowest ability. In our model, the level of unemployment is thus measured by t + ¡ t u . 5 For the rest of the paper, we assume that t + is large enough to ensure that full employment is never reached. The second requirement for no preemption is such
This condition on the parameters implies that the two¯rms are active in a competitive labor market. The following proposition summarizes our results:
Proposition 1 Under (9a) and (9b), the labor market equilibrium is characterized by a unique Nash equilibrium in wages given by (7) and (8) and by a level of unemployment equal to t + ¡ t u .
The following comments are in order. First, even though ex ante there is a continuum of heterogeneous workers, ex post the economy is characterized by three types of workers: the high-skill ones that works in the high-technologȳ rm, the low-skill individuals that are employed in the low-technology¯rm and the unemployed that are the workers with the lowest initial skills. However, in terms of utility, since workers bear all the education costs, there is ex post a continuum of utilities for the employed workers and a unique utility level (the unemployment bene¯t) for the unemployed. It is thus because workers are heterogeneous and because di®erent technologies are available in the economy that unemployment and inequality prevail in equilibrium. In this respect, our model captures some of the stylized facts described in the introduction.
Second, the equilibrium wage di®erential depends negatively on L and positively on H whereas t u is a positive function of H and L. In other words, an increase in workers' productivity reduces the wage di®erential as well as the level of unemployment since the competition in the labor market becomes ercer, re°ecting the externalities associated with the non-cooperative wagesetting framework: sector 1's speci¯c shock spills over to the other sector. We have thus a model in which workers' and¯rms' heterogeneity as well as imperfect competition lead to inequality both in terms of wages and unemployment.
Third, this proposition shows, at the Nash equilibrium, that the unemployed workers are those with the lowest initial abilities. On one hand, the unemployment can be viewed as voluntary since gross wages o®er insu±cient remuneration after education costs are substracted. On the other, the unemployment can also be viewed as involuntary due to the non-cooperative wage setting process, since, in the absence of the strategic interactions generated by this process, full employment may prevail. Indeed, it is easy to check that unemployment may prevail even if marginal productivities are su±ciently high (H > t + E 1 and L > t + E 2 ). In other words, should¯rm behave competitively and set wages at the level of marginal productivity, unemployment would disappear. The other main reason is that¯rms are not allowed to discriminate in wages. This implies that, in order to attract one more worker, it is necessary to increase wages for everybody. It is important to recall that unemployment implies that some types of workers are not employed. The problem here is independent of the absolute density of the interval [0; t + ]: should workers be more or less numerous, our conclusion would stay the same.
Finally, the implications of a minimum wage legislation are easy to trace. The minimum wage must be set above w N 2 in order to be e®ective. When this condition is satis¯ed, the low technology sector pays the minimum wage, so that unemployment decreases. Wages increase also in the high-technology sector but the wage di®erential decreases, so that the size of this last sector shrinks. This is in accordance with the empirical studies of Card and Krueger (1995) who stipulate that a minimum wage legislation must be imposed in sectors where¯rms have monopsonistic power.
Within this context, an obvious policy for lowering unemployment consists in reducing quali¯cation costs. By making education less costly, the government rends it more pro¯table for each workers to train, and thus to become employable in the labor market by meeting the low quali¯cation standards (non-selective policies). Such policies are indeed observed in the form of qual-i¯cation programs launched or¯nanced by governments. The government can also reduce the labor cost by subsidizing labor at the¯rm level, and more particularly labor in¯rm 2 since low ability workers tend to work in this¯rm (selective policies).
First-best allocation and selective policies 4.1 The¯rst-best allocation
Let us consider a utilitarian social welfare function de¯ned by the sum of¯rms' pro¯ts and workers' utility. It is equal to:
The second line of (10) shows that the total welfare is divided between the welfare of the skilled and the unskilled¯rm respectively. Observe that wages do not enter directly in the total welfare, but only indirectly through t u and t. This is due to the fact that the role of wages is solely to determine how the surplus is shared between¯rms and workers.
The¯rst best allocation is de¯ned for the values of t u andt that maximize the total welfare (10). By derivating (10) with respect to t u andt , we obtain the following¯rst best values:t
Not surprisingly, (11) and (12) correspond to the competitive allocations, i.e., the ones that yield wages to equate their marginal productivities (w e 1 = H and w e 2 = L). Recall that we have assumed condition (9b) in order to rule out preemption. Moreover, by using the Nash equilibrium in wages de¯ned in (7) and (8) and by plugging them into (3) and (4), we obtain the following Nash allocations:
t N u =
We obtain here a standard result of second best allocation since the wage competition between¯rms is imperfect. The reason of this ine±ciency is easily identi¯ed: in general, the allocation of workers is not e±cient sincet N is di®erent fromt e and the level of employment is too low. Formally,
Thus we can identify two possible e®ects from the government policy. Thē rst one illustrated by (15) is the reallocation e®ect (RE hereafter) whereas the second one (16) is the employment e®ect (EE hereafter). By a®ecting equilibrium net wages, the government can reallocate the workers between the two¯rms and cut the level of unemployment. The relevant question here is: can the government reach the¯rst best allocation de¯ned by (11) and (12) or is it restricted to second best policies? Let us¯rst consider the selective policies in which the government can discriminate between workers or¯rms.
Selective policies
We start with the policy which consists of subsiding di®erently wages in the two¯rms. Denote by s i (i = 1; 2) the ad valorem wage subsidy for¯rm i. The pro¯t functions (1) and (2) rewrite:
It is easy to show that the Nash equilibrium in wages are respectively:
By plugging (19) and (20) into (3) and (4), and by equating these new equations with (11) and (12); we easily obtain:
with lim
Then, by using condition (9b), we have:
The government can reach the¯rst best allocation by subsidinḡ rms 1 and 2 according to the selective wage subsidies de¯ned by (21) and (22).
The following comments are in order. First, in implementing a selective policy, the government must set a larger subsidy in¯rm 1 than in¯rm 2. This is due to the fact that the policy aims not only at reducing the level of unemployment but also at reallocating the workers between the two¯rms. Since our setting implies that the high-technology sector generates a greater surplus, it puts a high bias towards reallocating workers in this sector. If the only objective of the government was the reduction of unemployment, then the subsidy of one sector would have been enough. However, since misallocation e®ects are present, the government must combine the two instruments, s 1 and s 2 , in order to restore the¯rst best allocation. Even if both subsidies a®ect directly the equilibrium wages (19) and (20), and thus t u and e t; the optimal policy to restore the¯rst best allocation is to set s ¤ 1 > s ¤ 2 in order to put more weight on the¯rm that generates most of the ine±ciency, i.e. on¯rm 1 since it enjoys more market power. 6 The same result has been obtained in another context (dual labor market with e±ciency wage) by Bulow and Summers (1986) . Their result is even more extreme since they advocate the fact that the government should only subsidy wages in the primary sector. Second, when E 2 gets closer to E 1 , i.e., the education cost di®erential between the two¯rms is lower, the di®erence between s ¤ 1 and s ¤ 2 becomes lower since the RE is smaller. Third, when H increases or when L decreases, the di®erence between s ¤ 1 and s ¤ 2 becomes greater because the larger the productivity di®erential, the higher the welfare cost due to the misallocation of workers between¯rms. Last, in general, it is advocated that the government should subsidy only workers choosinḡ rm 2 (low-skill workers) since it is the \critical workforce" with respect to the unemployment problem (see for example Drµ eze and Malinvaud (1994) who propose to subsidy only the low-quali¯ed workers). In our setting, such a policy will clearly be e±cient in lowering unemployment. Indeed, it basically allows low-technology¯rms to o®er more attractive wages to workers, given the prevailing productivity conditions. In this respect, our results point out the fact that cutting unemployment alone leads to a misallocation of workers thus to a social cost. The problem them amounts to compare the relative importance of this social costs against the bene¯ts of increasing employment.
The second selective policy consists in subsiding the education cost. Pro¯t functions are the same as (1) and (2) and, by denoting by g i (i = 1; 2), the ad valorem education cost subsidy, we obtain the Nash equilibrium in wages:
As before we obtain the following the optimal subsidies:
These expressions are very cumbersome but this is not surprising since education cost subsidies a®ect net wages in two opposite ways. They rise equilibrium gross wages but at the same time they reduce the level of education cost. In the previous case, wages subsidies were a®ecting only gross wages, and thus a®ected¯rms' strategies directly. More importantly, g ¤ 1 and g ¤ 2 are not de¯ned for all the parameter constellations. In general, g ¤ 1 must be greater than g ¤ 2 and there is no guarantee that g ¤ 1 < 1: This shows that a selective policy based on the education cost subsidy is more problematic to implement than the one based on wage subsidy. Indeed, the¯rst best allocation is not always possible in the former case whereas it is always true in the latter one.
Non-selective policies
In a lot of countries, the government cannot implement a selective policy because of legal or institutional constraints. For example, unions or political parties may be opposed to discriminatory policies especially ours which induces the government to subsidy more the wage of the skilled¯rm in order to reach the¯rst best allocation. In this case, the government will like to achieve a second best outcome by maximizing the total welfare. To this end, it proposes two di®erent non-selective policies, an education policy and a labor cost policy. However, it must take into account the non-cooperative behavior of¯rms, i.e., the welfare function must incorporate the¯rms' wage setting through e t N and t N u .
The education policy
We now assume that the government subsidizes a fraction°of the total education cost whatever the ability of the worker is and whatever the¯rm chosen by the worker. Observe however that the lower the ability, the larger the subsidy, which in turn favors low-ability workers. We consider now the e®ect of this policy on the competition between¯rms. Formally, the reservation wage of an individual of type t working in¯rm i is de¯ned by
As a direct consequence of the government policy, reservation wage distributions are driven downwards. This changes the value of t u andt since it a®ects the net wage di®erential. Formally we have:
These two equations imply that S°i (w 1 ; w 2 ) = 1 1¡°S i (w 1 ; w 2 ). Therefore¯rst order conditions are not modi¯ed and the level of wages in equilibrium is not a®ected by the introduction of the education policy. Hence, subsidizing workers' education cost does not in°uence¯rms' strategies. Marginal pro¯ts are not modi¯ed and equilibrium wages are still given by equations (7) and (8) . However, equilibrium labor supplies change since reservation wages decrease. We have:
The education policy has an unambiguous e®ect on unemployment. Wages are not modi¯ed whereas reservation wages decrease and thus unemployment is lower. Moreover, this policy also implies a reallocation of the workforce. Sincet°; N is greater thant N , there will be more people working in the high-quali¯cation¯rm. In short, the education policy implies that workers whose ability is ranging from e t N to e t°; N switch from¯rm 2 to¯rm 1 whereas workers whose ability is between t N u and t°; N u now work in¯rm 2 instead of being unemployed.
The labor cost policy
The labor cost policy consists in providing each¯rm with an ad valorem subsidy ¾ for every worker it hires. This subsidy ¾ is proportional to the wage o®ered by the¯rm. In this case, reservation wages are still de¯ned by tE i , (i = 1; 2), but equilibrium wages are di®erent because¯rms' marginal pro¯ts change. Contrarily to the previous policy,¯rms' strategies are a®ected by this policy. Pro¯t functions are now de¯ned by:
This yields the equilibrium wage candidates to be:
Observe that w ¾;N i = w N i 1¡¾ , and therefore the following equilibrium relations are easily established:
Note that these relations di®er from those established for the education policy since the former are valid only in equilibrium whereas the latter hold for all values of w 1 and w 2 .
Analysis of the two policies
We¯rst consider the welfare e®ects of the two policies. By comparing the allocations of the education policy in (31) and (32) and the ones of the labor cost policy in (37) and (38), it is obvious that, in equilibrium, the two policies lead to the same level of welfare for ¾ =°. Thus, the welfare analysis is equivalent for the two policies. The following proposition summarizes our discussion. 7 Proposition 3 Consider only the non-selective policies. In the education policy, the equilibrium wages are not a®ected whereas the reservation wages are. In the labor cost policy, the reservation wages are not modi¯ed whereas the equilibrium wages are. However, the equilibrium net wages in both policies are identical. This leads to the same level of optimal subsidy.
It is immediate to see that the¯rst best allocation can never be reached by a non-selective policy since the government has one instrument (¾ or°) and two targets (11) and (12) . Formally, it is equivalent to solve a system of two equations with one unknown. Thus we now turn to second best policies bȳ rst focussing on the education policy. All the results of the education policy can be interpreted the same way for the labor cost policy. The welfare function (10) rewrites:
First, observe that this welfare is a net one since it takes implicitly into account both the gain for the workers, i.e., Rt°;N 0°t E 1 dt + R t°; N ũ t°; N°t E 2 dt and the cost 7 Observe that the equivalence between subsidizing education and subsidizing wages is not a standard result in labour economics. It is due in fact to the speci¯city of our model. Indeed, the problem is one of ex ante under-investment by workers. The incentive schedule o®ered by¯rms is not¯rst best because of monopsony. But having a benevolent planner giving a subsidy ex ante on training or ex post on wages is just the same.
for the government, i.e., ¡ Rt°;N 0°t E 1 dt ¡ R t°; N ũ t°; N°t E 2 dt. Obviously, these two terms cancel when added and the welfare is thus equal to (39). One possible interpretation is that the policy is¯nanced by a lump-sum tax on rms. What is left in (39) is just the allocation e®ects. This leads us to our second observation. The education policy has two e®ects: a reallocation e®ect (RE) that induces workers to change¯rms because of their new reservation wages and an employment e®ect (EE) that induces some workers to accept now a job in¯rm 2. Formally, we have: @W @°= @W @ e t°; N @ e t°; N @°+ @W @t°; N u @t°; N u @°( 40)
Observe that according to (31) and (32), @ e t°; N @°a nd @t°; N u @°a re positive. Moreover, the¯rst term of the RHS of (40), the RE, is positive as long as e t°; N = 1 1¡°e t N < H¡L E 1 ¡E 2 = e t e . Increasing°always implies that more individuals are willing to work in¯rm 1. However, we know from (15) that independently of the policy, there could be already too many workers in¯rm 1 at the Nash equilibrium compared to the¯rst best allocation. In other words, increasing°c an be ine±cient. Thus, if e t N < e t e , the education policy has a positive e®ect up to e t N = e t e whereas if e t N > e t e , this policy has always a negative reallocation e®ect. The second term of the RHS of (40) describes the EE. By (16) , it is always e±cient to increase°up to t N u = t e u . When these two e®ects are combined, the net result depends on the parameters H, L; E 1 and E 2 . It is useful to evaluate these two e®ects, the RE and the EE, when°= 0, i.e., when there is no government policy. It is easy to check that the EE is always strictly positive whereas the RE depends on:
After simpli¯cations of (40), the FOC yields: "
Solving this expression for°leads to:°¤
where e t N and t N u are respectively de¯ned by (13) and (14) . In order to decide which level of°¤ leads to a second best, the government must balance between the two e®ects, the RE and the EE, by comparing the di®erent parameters H, L; E 1 and E 2 . However,°¤ de¯ned by (43) can be less or equal to 0 (in which case°¤ = 0), or positive but strictly less than 1 (it In the¯rst one (case (c)), the values of the parameters are very similar and thus the two sectors are nearly identical. In this case, the competition is very¯erce between the two¯rms and thus the wage outcome is very close to the Bertrand one. The equilibrium allocations are therefore very close to the competitive one (¯rst best) and the government has no interest to set a positive°¤ . In the last case (case (d)), the two industries are very di®erentiated, both in terms of the productivities (H >> L) and levels of quali¯cation (E 1 >> E 2 ). Firm 1 is clearly very dominant in the market and the competition is similar to a monopsonistic one. The government policy will therefore force the monopsonistic¯rm to implement the competitive allocations. Since the labor supply addressed to the monopsonistic¯rm is linear, this¯rm will hire half of the e±cient labor force. The government will obviously set a°¤ = 0:5 to restore the competitive allocations. Observe that these two polar cases ((c) and (d)) are respectively the less and the more ine±cient ones and thus de¯ne the range of°¤; i.e.,°¤ 2 [0; 0:5].
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a stylized model of the labor market in which a high-skill sector interacts with a low-skill one. The upshot of the model is that workers' heterogeneity leads to interdependent equilibrium wages since each¯rm requires its workers to incur education costs (the high technologȳ rm requiring more costly education). Thus, the lower the ability, the higher the education cost and the more di±cult it is to¯nd a job. In this framework, individuals with the lowest ability are the most likely to stay unemployed because their education cost is too high, even with respect to the low-skill sector. At the Nash equilibrium, two kinds of ine±ciencies are observed: too few workers are employed and workers are missallocated across sectors.
Two types of policies are contemplated. The¯rst one, the selective policies consist of subsidizing di®erently¯rms or workers by either subsidizing the education cost or the wage. We show that the¯rst best allocation can be obtained by giving a larger subsidy to the high-technology¯rm than to the other one. For the non-selective policies, which consists of helping everybody by either subsidizing the education cost or the wage, the¯rst best allocation can never be reached. Therefore, second best policies are implemented. Since the¯rst best allocation involves both a reallocation e®ect between the twō rms and an employment e®ect, the second best policies are restricted to a trade o® between these two e®ects. In this context, we show that the two ad valorem subsidies are equivalent at the Nash equilibrium.
